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UK Anti-Slavery Policy at the Border: Humanitarian Opportunism and the Challenge of 
Victim Consent to Assistance 
Introduction 
In 2014 the UK government launched its first Modern Slavery Strategy, sealing the UK’s 
commitment to fighting what the current Prime Minister, Theresa May, has called ‘the 
greatest human rights issue of our time’ (May, 2016). The UK Border Force is one of only 
four state agencies1 to be given a ‘crucial’ and cross-cutting role in the delivery of this 
Strategy. Amongst other things, Border Force Officers have been designated as ‘anti-
trafficking first responders’, with particular duties to ‘identify potential victims and provide 
enhanced support and protection against re-trafficking’ (HM Government, 2014, p. 55). This 
paper examines how this new humanitarian role for the Border Force Officer has been 
conceptualized, justified and apparently reconciled with the aims of migration policy and 
border control. It draws on findings from a series of in-depth interviews with a dedicated 
Border Force Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team at the UK’s largest airport to shed light 
on how these new duties of victim protection and support are being put into practice on the 
ground. The paper offers an account of the challenges to victim identification and support at 
the border and highlights the difficulties of addressing these for the benefit of those 
trafficked.  
There is a growing body of criminological research investigating the pursuit of humanitarian 
ideals in the context of border control. However, this is focused heavily on the field of 
search and rescue at sea (Aas and Gundhus, 2015; Perkowski, 2016; Squire, 2017). In 
                                                          
1 The other three agencies are the police service, the National Crime Agency, and the Gangmasters and Labour 
Abuse Authority- the agency responsible for preventing, detecting and responding to cases of labour 
exploitation, though the role of this latter agency is limited as it only operates across a small number of sectors. 
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comparison, anti-trafficking victim identification and support is still a nascent area of 
humanitarian border control. As a result, empirical studies of how such efforts play out at 
the border remain few and far between (Ham et al, 2013; Pickering and Ham, 2014). This 
paper attempts to address this relative lack of insight into anti-trafficking first response at 
the border.  
 
Our analysis also takes forward critical debates about the coherence of humanitarian anti-
slavery policy and the consistency of its ambitions with a continued prioritization by 
governments of security policy and immigration control. In particular, our analysis lends 
support to O’Connell Davidson and others, who argue that strict migration and security 
policies increase the economic and social vulnerability of some migrant groups and thereby 
exacerbate the structural drivers of trafficking (O’Connell Davidson, 2015, 2017; Sharma, 
2017).  In doing so, it casts doubt on the view expressed in the policy discourse and beyond 
(McAdam, 2013; HM Government, 2014; UN OHCHR, 2010), that a human-rights approach 
to anti-trafficking or anti-slavery policy at the border is practically achievable.  
 
The UK government has only recently adopted the term ‘modern slavery’ to describe what 
had previously been referred to as ‘human trafficking’ or ‘trafficking in persons’. In so doing, 
it has aligned its Modern Slavery Strategy with what has become known as the ‘new 
abolitionist’ movement, pioneered by activist and academic Kevin Bales. This move has been 
criticized vigorously, most notably by Julia O’Connell Davidson, who has argued that the 
conceptual shift away from trafficking to slavery presents the phenomenon as a problem of 
moral wrongdoing by individuals (or ‘evil’ in the words of the UK’s current Prime Minister 
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[May, 2016]) and in so doing elides questions of state-sustained structural conditions, which 
enable large-scale coercion and exploitation. 
As our analysis supports O’Connell Davidson’s position, we continue to use ‘human 
trafficking’ instead of ‘modern slavery’ when doing so does not misrepresent the positions 
or agents we discuss. Similarly, we are cognizant of the problematic aspects of using the 
word ‘victim’ to refer to people who may themselves reject such a label. Indeed, we deal 
with this issue directly in Part II of the paper. Where possible, then, we speak of ‘those 
trafficked’ or ‘those identified as victims’ rather than ‘victims of trafficking’. 
Background 
According to the UK government, Border Force Officers are uniquely well-placed to act as 
anti-slavery first responders because: ‘victims who are trafficked will often cross our borders 
and we need to use that opportunity to identify them and to intervene’ (Independent Chief 
Inspector of Borders, 2017: 6.14). Yet 3 years on from the publication of the UK’s Modern 
Slavery Strategy, the figures reveal a startling disparity between government’s expectations 
of Border Force as an agency of first response and the reality on the ground. For in 2016, 
less than 2.9% of the 3805 referrals made in the UK came from Border Force.2 What might 
explain the disparity between the government’s expectations of the Border Force and the 
reality on the ground, and how should it be addressed?  
Official responses to this question tend to focus critical scrutiny on Border Force 
performance rather than on the expectations placed upon them (and indeed on other first 
responder agencies) by the government. They imply that the success of victim identification 
                                                          
2  The National Crime Agency (NCA) End of Year Summary 2016 shows that of the 3805 people referred to the 
National Referral Mechanism, only 111 were referred by UKBF. 94% of those 3805 were non-UK citizens. 
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and protection is ultimately down to the anti-slavery first responder. For example, the first 
ever review of anti-slavery at the border, published in 2017, opens with an admonition of 
Border Force to take more seriously its anti-slavery role:  
‘Border Force has a duty and responsibility to respond to the crime of slavery with 
urgency and efficiency, as recognised in the UK Government’s Modern Slavery 
Strategy…Modern slavery is not simply a matter of numbers, targets and processes 
for Border Force to manage; human lives are at stake and people’s freedom is in 
question’ (Kevin Hyland, UK Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner in Independent 
Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017).  
The author of that report, the government-appointed Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders, recognises that victim identification and protection is challenging; but he ultimately 
highlights deficiencies in Border Force practice to explain the current low rate of success. 
Similarly, his recommendations for improvement relate solely to Border Force practice, 
including better training, information-keeping and decision-making (Ibid, 2017 p.3). The 
message conveyed is that, if only Border Force Officers took their responsibilities seriously, 
followed the guidance, and were well enough trained, victims would be better identified 
and protected.  
In this paper, we present research that tells a different story. Our aim is not to cast doubt on 
the claim that there is room for improvement in Border Force practice in this area. Rather, it 
is to draw attention to some of the serious constraints faced by Border Force Officers in 
their efforts to meet the expectations placed upon them as first responders and, in doing so, 
to shed critically constructive light both on those expectations and on the government’s 
approach to anti-slavery first response more broadly. Our analysis, which draws on relevant 
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policy documentation and a series of in-depth interviews with a dedicated Safeguarding and 
Anti-Trafficking team at the UK’s largest airport, shows how the government’s anti-slavery 
expectations are underpinned by a distinct normative rationale, which aims to render the 
objectives of migration policy consistent with the protection of those vulnerable to human 
trafficking. This rationale, which we conceptualise as a kind of ‘humanitarian opportunism’, 
grounds anti-slavery obligations not in the role of the professional but in the contingent 
existence of opportunities to help—in this case, to ‘save’ others. We identify two distinctive 
and problematic ways in which humanitarian logic is being employed to justify anti-slavery 
first response at the border. First, it rests on ungrounded assumptions—both about the 
existence of genuine opportunities to identify and offer support to those identified as 
victims, and about the ultimate value of the support on offer. Second, it is used by the 
government in order to justify the co-option of Border Force Officers into the pursuit of 
policy causes that not only lie outside the normal scope of their professional remit but 
actively conflict with it, as we claim is the case with respect to the competing demands of 
victim response and immigration control at the border. We contend that this results in the 
imposition by the Modern Slavery Strategy of demands on Border Force Officers that are 
competing but irreconcilable in ways that changes to their practice alone cannot resolve.  
Moreover, we argue that the deployment of this rationale at the border is paradigmatic of 
an increasingly frequent appropriation by security and governmental agents of 
humanitarian and human rights discourse in order to reframe and justify the pursuit of 
other, potentially conflicting, policy aims, in this case migration and crime control. In doing 
so, we lend support to recent literature on migration and border control which criticises this 
blurring or elision between the pursuit of security and humanitarian policy aims as 
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incoherent and potentially damaging to vulnerable people (Perkowski, 2017; Sharma, 2017; 
Pickering and Ham, 2014; Aas and Gundhus, 2015; Hadjimatheou and Lynch, 2017).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Part I analyses the UK government’s modern slavery 
agenda, provides an account of the role of Border Force within it, and articulates and 
develops the concept of humanitarian opportunism. The arguments put forward in this 
section are supported primarily by means of examination of policy documents and academic 
literature. In Part 2 we present the methodology for our study with a Border Force anti-
trafficking team at London’s Heathrow airport and discuss the findings. We identify two 
distinct challenges faced in the implementation of anti-slavery first response at the border. 
The first relates to the fact that in practice EU freedom of movement exempts the majority 
of people trafficked into the UK from being risk-assessed for indicators of vulnerability by 
Border Force Officers. The second relates to the fact that current policy makes the provision 
of assistance to those trafficked dependent on their consenting on the spot to being 
formally registered as a ‘victim’ of trafficking ‘crime’- something many of those trafficked 
are understandably reluctant to do. The paper concludes by reflecting on what these 
findings imply about the gap between the aspirations and likely achievements of anti-
slavery policy at the border, and the compatibility of humanitarian agendas and migration 
and crime control more broadly. 
 
Part 1: The UK’s Modern Slavery Strategy at the Border: The Logic of Opportunity  
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The designation of Border Force Officers as ‘trafficking first responders’ (Home Office, 
2016b) has come about despite the fact that neither their professional culture as a law 
enforcement agency, nor their prior training or experience has involved significant focus on 
the protection of vulnerable adults. The rationale for this move is that borders present a site 
of ‘unique opportunity to identify victims’ (Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017). The 
opportunity is presented as arising in one or more of three ways. First, those trafficked are 
often brought into the country from abroad, at which point Border Force Officers are likely 
to encounter them. Second, Border Force Officers are often said to be the last figures of 
authority to come into contact with people who have been trafficked before they 
‘disappear’ into exploitation; their contact with those trafficked thus presents a (potentially) 
final chance to prevent that exploitation from occurring (Centre for Social Justice, 2013). 
Third, Border Force Officers have considerable powers of question and search under 
immigration and customs regulation. The value of these powers in helping to uncover 
‘indicators of trafficking’ is said to put Border Force Officers in a strong position to be able to 
identify those trafficked. As the Executive Director of the EU border agency Frontex declares 
in his foreword to their anti-slavery training manual: ‘[B]order control — with its systematic 
checks — has a unique role and ability to intervene, prevent and combat trafficking in 
human beings’ (Frontex, 2012: 7).  
According to this logic of opportunity, the primary challenge to successful victim support at 
the border is not finding those trafficked, but learning to recognise them. People who are 
being trafficked, it is often pointed out are ‘hidden in plain sight’ (Anti-Trafficking 
Monitoring Group, 2013), circulating amongst otherwise indistinct populations, doing work 
that appears normal to observers (Local Government Association, 2017). Border Force’s 
main anti-slavery activity is thus raising awarenes
8 
 
to the risk and to the signs to look out for’ and then training them to recognise those signs 
(Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017; Frontex, 2012). The emphasis on awareness, 
identification, and recognition is apparent throughout the Strategy and its agency-specific 
related documents. We shed critical light on this emphasis later in this paper, suggesting 
that these initial forms of intervention are of questionable value if implemented without 
sufficient provision of longer-term protection, compensation, and support. At this point, 
however, we explore in more depth how the government grounds these duties of 
recognition in a logic of opportunity.  
Border Force Officers are designated as ‘anti-trafficking first responders’ by the Home Office 
not because border control relates in some fundamental way to the protection of human 
rights, nor because ports and border crossings are sites of exploitation, but rather, ‘based on 
the likelihood that they would encounter potential victims’ (Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders, 2017). Thus it is the sheer flows of people passing through border control, amongst 
whom there will inevitably be people who are being trafficked, that creates an imperative to 
intervene.  
The opportunity to intervene is presented as something more profound than merely a 
chance to contribute to the pursuit of a governmental priority; namely, a possibility to save 
another human being from enslavement. This portrayal of anti-slavery as serving an urgent 
moral cause reflects a well-established consensus both in normative human rights theory 
and in human rights movements: that the protection of basic human rights should take 
precedence over (or, in the language of political philosophy, should ‘trump’ [Dworkin, 
1984]) the exigencies of other governmental priorities, such as migration control. But its real 
strength as a motivating rationale lies in its universality and its pre-theoretical moral appeal: 
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there is no need to refer to religion, political values or professional codes to explain why we 
should all be ready to help those in dire need; it is a basic duty of care we all owe to each 
other as human beings. This kind of supportive rationale is essential for the success of the 
anti-slavery strategy, because it enables the government to bypass any professional 
inexperience or qualms officials may have in taking on the mantle of first responder and 
appeal to their better nature instead.  
 
The reality remains, however, that Border Force Officers are being co-opted into state 
agendas that not only radically diverge from, but also potentially conflict with, the purpose 
of their profession.3 There is now a requirement to sort people at the border on the basis of 
their vulnerability,4 rather than their immigration status. This is presented as continuous 
with the values and priorities driving frontline Border Force work, yet it in fact entails a 
significant shift from them. As has long been pointed out by theorists of surveillance, 
borders are paradigmatic sites of social sorting (Lyon, 2007; Aas, 2011). The primary 
criterion of distinction for such sorting is immigration status. The inculcation of a 
humanitarian anti-slavery agenda into border control challenges the prevailing logic of the 
border by requiring border officials to approach travellers ‘primarily as… individuals with 
protection and assistance needs [rather than as] threats to border integrity’ (McAdam, 
2013: 46). In other words, it requires Border Force Officers to be both attuned to and to 
                                                          
3 The co-option of law enforcement officers into safeguarding agendas is also occurring in the context of the 
UK’s ‘Strategy to end violence against women and girls 2016-2020’, under which police have acquired similar 
responsibilities to identify and safeguard vulnerable individuals. An example of specific responsibilities can be 
seen in the Mayor of London’s Strategy, which allocates protective duties to the Metropolitan Police, see:  
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/vawg_strategy.pdf 
4 There has always been a requirement to look out for vulnerable children because children have always had a 
distinct, protected status in the law. But this has also been controversial in practice, as it often involves efforts 
to determine the age of those arriving in ways that visit suspicion and intrusive scrutiny on them (McLaughlin, 
2017). 
10 
 
respond primarily to the vulnerability of travellers, irrespective of their immigration status- 
thus inverting the priorities of border control.  What is more, this apparently radical attempt 
to co-opt border officials into humanitarian policy agendas is presented as compatible with 
the work of immigration control, rather than disruptive or subversive of it. As McAdam 
explains in her defence of a human rights approach to border control:  
A rights-based approach to border control acknowledges the core work of border 
officials as being to uphold border integrity, while ensuring that their performance of 
this role does not jeopardize the rights of those they intercept nor result in missed 
opportunities for specialists to identify trafficked persons and other vulnerable people 
among them. (McAdam, 2013: 33) 
The idea that the work of border control is compatible with a proactive humanitarian anti-
slavery policy is supported within Border Force as a logical extension of well-established, 
existing law and practice around child protection. Indeed, the new ‘Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking’ teams are in fact expanded and rebranded versions of longstanding Child and 
Youth Protection Teams. In what follows we cast serious doubt on the extent to which the 
reconciliation between border control and humanitarian anti-slavery work imagined by 
McAdam is achievable and discuss in detail some of the problematic consequences of the 
conflation of vulnerable adults with children by Border Force.  
 
For now, however, let us focus on the organisational response to the Modern Slavery 
Strategy, which appears to be ambivalent with respect to whether safeguarding and anti-
trafficking should or should not be a core competency of border control. While Border Force 
has implemented mandatory basic training in anti-slavery law and policy for Border Force 
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Officers, it seen by many as a tick-box exercise. Indeed, the recent inspection of Border 
Force reveals that the organisation has not been monitoring let alone enforcing the uptake 
of this training, with some designated Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officers not having 
received any relevant training at all (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017). Indeed, 
the imposition of a humanitarian role on the Border Force has met with internal resistance 
from some Officers, who see their role beginning and ending with the enforcement of the 
border (Authors, 2017). Some Border Force Officers want to keep the lines between security 
and immigration policy and safeguarding/humanitarian work clear in the face of increased 
blurring of the discursive boundaries between these categories. Thus in practice 
Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking work seems to be undertaken on a largely voluntary basis, 
via specialised Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking teams, which take on the role of 
interviewing and dealing with those identified as ‘potential victims of trafficking’ or PVOTs 
(Ibid.).  
 
This apparent ambivalence has been challenged by the UK’s Independent Anti-Slavery 
Commissioner. According to his assessment, implementation of the Modern Slavery 
Strategy requires that professional commitment to the anti-slavery role be demanded from 
Border Force Officers across the board (Hyland, K. in Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders, 2017). Only then, he argues, can the force meet its responsibilities to ‘disrupt 
modern slavery at our borders and ultimately ensure those traded as human commodities 
are protected’ (Ibid.). 
In the following section, we argue that the protection of victims at the border would likely 
continue to fall well below expectations even if these responsibilities were met.  This is 
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because the possibilities for effective protection are determined not only by the extent of 
institutional buy in and streamlined practice, but also on the existence of genuine 
opportunities to provide genuine help, neither of which are sufficiently present at the 
border. 
 
Part 2: Humanitarian opportunism in action: anti-slavery first response at the border  
So far, we have examined the role of the Border Force in the UK government’s Modern 
Slavery Strategy in a relatively abstract, ‘top-down’ way. In this section we shift perspective 
and examine it from the bottom up, through the views of officers actively engaged in anti-
slavery border work on the ground. In what follows we present findings from a series of in-
depth interviews with members of a single Safeguarding and Anti-trafficking team at 
London’s Heathrow Airport.  
We approached Heathrow because it is the busiest airport in the UK, has taken more 
concerted efforts- through training, resourcing, and the development of good partnership 
working amongst other things- to prioritise anti-slavery than any other airport, and has the 
largest UKBF Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team in the country, comprising 15 officers 
when the study took place. All the Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officers we spoke to 
had received both the mandatory online training and attended a specialist 4-day course. In 
contrast, it is reported that some ports in the UK had designated individuals as Safeguarding 
and Anti-Trafficking officers despite their having received no Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking training at all (Ibid. 3.6). Heathrow has also seen higher numbers of 
identifications of ‘potential victims’: more than all other ports put together in the period 
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2014-15 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017, 8.3 fig.6).5 Nevertheless, we note 
the difficulty in assessing the relative success of Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking initiatives 
due to a recognized paucity of published data, particularly in relation to the numbers of 
potential victims identified and referred to the National Referral Mechanism6 (the UK’s 
official process for identifying victims of human trafficking or modern slavery and referring 
them upwards to the authorities for formal recognition as trafficked and provision of 
assistance) (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017; Lynch and Hadjimatheou, 2017). 
We undertook semi-structured interviews with 10 officers in total: 9 members of the 
Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team and one officer who was intending to train.7 Data 
collection was carried out by the authors and took place on-site at Heathrow Airport in May 
2015 following full ethical approval from the University of XXX’s Research Ethics Committee 
on 14 November 2014 (ref. 40/14-15). Each interview was recorded and typically lasted for 
60-90 minutes. Our sample of research participants was necessarily small due to the focus 
on the relatively few Border Force Officers who had received Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking training at the time. Our fieldwork was also limited by the impact of general 
Border Force staff shortages on rotas, meaning that we were unable to interview the entire 
Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team in the allocated time. Restrictions on time and 
budget (this research was a small part of a larger programme of work) inevitably shaped our 
                                                          
5 Though not as high a rate of referral to the National Referral Mechanism as at other ports. It is difficult to 
draw reliable conclusions from these discrepancies. While a higher rate of referral might indicate a more 
successful approach, it was reported in the recent Inspection (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017) 
that some ports were referring all clandestine travellers to the National Referral Mechanism, only for such 
referrals to be rejected at the earliest stage.  
6 National Referral Mechanism referral form for adult victims of trafficking, 2016. At 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631200/Adult-NRM-
v.3.0.pdf 
7 This participant provided a sympathetic but external view of the team, its purpose, and motivations for 
joining. 
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methods and limited the scope of our research. For example, previous studies on border 
policing have engaged in ethnographic observations to understand more fully the actual 
practice of border force officers (Loftus, 2015; Pickering & Ham, 2014). Future research into 
safeguarding and anti-trafficking activities at the border would benefit from a similar 
approach to explore how potential victims of trafficking are identified and dealt with on a 
daily basis. Nevertheless, to our knowledge this study was the first –and remains the only- 
of its kind to interview Border Force Officers engaged in Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking 
work in the UK about their experiences of this novel duty.  
The officers we spoke to were both senior and junior—most were responsible for dealing 
with safeguarding and/or trafficking issues referred to them on a day to day basis by other 
immigration officers; but we also interviewed the officer managing Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking intelligence and the strategic lead for safeguarding and trafficking at Heathrow. 
Eight of the 10 officers were women, and both of the men were at the start of their careers.  
Our approach to data collection and analysis was influenced by the narrative tradition in 
social research: posing minimal and open-ended questions intended to provoke reflection 
and discussion from Border Force Officers about their individual experiences of the job—
primarily what their work meant to them and what aspects of it they found challenging or 
rewarding. Example questions included: 
1. Could you tell us about the safeguarding and anti-trafficking work you do? 
2. What kind of challenges are there to trying to identify victims of trafficking at the 
border? 
3. How do you feel about your work in the SAT team? 
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Narrative approaches look beyond questions of truth and consistency to exploration of ‘the 
complex nature of values, identities, cultures, and communities’ (Sandberg, 2010: 448). 
Analysis was therefore driven by the need to theorise from the narratives intact to 
understand how our participants created meaning and made sense of their roles as Border 
Force Officers (Etherington, 2004). We also undertook thematic analysis to identify shared 
experiences.8 By prioritizing the perspectives and voices of Border Force Officers, our 
approach helps us gain insight into the ‘culture and practices of those involved in the daily 
upkeep of border priorities’ which, despite notable exceptions (Aas and Gundhus; 2015 
Pickering and Ham, 2014; Pratt and Thompson, 2008), remains largely undertheorized, as 
noted by Loftus (2015: 11). In taking this approach, we did not seek corroboration of our 
participants’ accounts through other methods of validation. Border Force Officers spoke 
candidly about their experiences but we acknowledge that they told us the ‘stories’ they 
wanted us to hear, and those perspectives may have been influenced by their motivations 
for participating in the research. For example, senior officers in the Border Force were keen 
to promote the work of the Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team and potentially use the 
research project to make contacts with teams doing similar work in other ports. Although 
efforts have been made to report the data of individuals in a confidential way, participants 
were aware that the identity of Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team would be disclosed.   
The Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officers we spoke to were not typical of Border Force 
Officers at Heathrow, but had self-selected into the anti-slavery role for a range of personal 
and professional reasons that would—inevitably and understandably—not be present for 
others. For example, a core number (4) of those longest serving Border Force Officers that 
                                                          
8 We reported on the occupational culture of the team in our previous paper (ref to be supplied) 
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we spoke to had been members of the Heathrow Child and Youth Protection team which 
had preceded the formation of Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team. As we illustrate 
further below, these distinctive aspects make the perspectives of the Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking team indispensable to understanding persistent, organizational and structural 
challenges to anti-slavery at the border. In particular, the perspectives of Safeguarding and 
Anti-Trafficking officers are not clouded by cultural and professional resistance to the anti-
slavery agenda; on the contrary, they demonstrate precisely the kind of deep moral and 
professional commitment to the humanitarian cause propounded in the Modern Slavery 
Strategy and which the Anti-Slavery Commissioner identifies as vital to successful victim 
protection. This was illustrated in many of their responses to the question with which we 
opened our interviews, which asked them what their job means to them. For example, one 
Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team member replied thus: 
Some people don't want to deal with [safeguarding and anti-trafficking work] because 
they just can't deal with it.  It's just one of those things. Personally, I like my job.  I like 
helping people… [Before Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking training was rolled out to 
senior staff] Chief Immigration Officers wouldn't take me seriously.  And I'm trying to 
push, saying that this is a safeguarding issue, we need to do this, we need to do that.  
And then some CIOs are, like I said, just like officers, they just think about immigration 
and they just want to get that person off the [passport] control [desk]: “wherever they 
go, it's fine, up to them”, you know.  I had too many brushes with not very nice CIOs 
[laugh] who were not listening to us about the safeguarding things… the training is 
now disseminated to all levels, so they're becoming a bit more understanding. [P4]  
Similarly, another Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officer told us: 
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I'm here to protect the border but I'm also here to protect vulnerable adults and 
children. … I think really people don't believe that we are here to protect…I don't think 
people believe that we're here to protect the vulnerable and the children.  Yes, we will 
maintain how we are, and the officers on the Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking team 
here, they are dedicated… they will fight tooth and nail to make sure that child is safe, 
no matter what.  Even if they get complaints in, right, don't care.  You can complain 
about me, as long as I know that child is safe, you can complain as much as you like… 
[P9] 
These self-descriptions by officers suggest that, for them, anti-slavery work is not, as the 
UK’s Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner suggests ‘simply a matter of numbers, targets 
and processes for Border Force to manage (Hyland, K., UK Independent Anti-Slavery 
Commissioner in Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017). Rather, as the above 
quotes show, they are keenly aware of the fact that ‘human lives are at stake and people’s 
freedom is in question’ and go to significant lengths to identify those trafficked and fulfil 
their ‘duty and responsibility to respond to the crime of slavery with urgency and efficiency, 
as recognised in the UK Government’s Modern Slavery’ (Ibid.) 
Let us turn, then to consider their views on the key challenges facing effective anti-slavery 
first response at the border. 
 
Challenge 1: Where’s the opportunity? EU exceptionalism means immigration trumps 
vulnerability once more.  
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In their 2011 analysis of anti-trafficking and the Border Force, Balch and Geddes suggested 
that ‘measures to enforce immigration rules and the economic rationale of selection that 
has informed ‘managed migration’ policy in the UK may not rest easily with approaches that 
seek to recognise and protect the victims of trafficking’. (2011: 28) The tension they had in 
mind, and which is often highlighted in the anti-trafficking literature, arises because many of 
those trafficked qualify also as illegal migrants; thus political pressure to reduce illegal 
migration risks fuelling the miscategorisation of those trafficked as (mere) illegal migrants at 
the cost of recognizing their safeguarding needs (Goodey, 2003; Aradau, 2004; Massey and 
Collucello, 2015; O’Connell Davidson, 2017).  
In this section we highlight a different and until now unacknowledged tension between 
immigration control and anti-slavery at the border. Unlike the well-documented tension 
that arises between the protection of victims of trafficking and the strict enforcement of 
immigration control, the tension we wish to draw attention to arises when immigration 
controls are removed, namely for European citizens. Here, the risk is that those trafficked 
are miscategorised as mere legal migrants, leading to a failure to identify them and offer 
them support. Indeed, European freedom of movement was cited by the Safeguarding and 
Anti-Trafficking officers we spoke to as the principal challenge to their ability to identify 
victims at the border (Authors, 2017).9  
There is nothing in immigration regulation that prevents Border Force Officers stopping and 
questioning EEA nationals at passport control, nor is there any clause absolving them of 
                                                          
9 Despite reporting that it is impossible to help EU PVOTs without special operations, Border Force Officers also 
gave us 3 examples of EU citizens being identified at the border as PVOTs. The inconsistency is, in our view, only 
apparent, however. For these examples were clear outliers, involving as they did an unaccompanied white 
Finnish minor wearing a burka; a woman who was accompanied by someone already known to Border Force as 
probably trafficked for sexual exploitation; and a woman who self-presented as trafficked. 
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their obligation to take proactive measures to identify victims of trafficking if they present at 
borders with EEA passports. Rather, the difficulties arise at the level of supranational policy 
because officers are instructed to refrain from acting in ways that have the effect of 
restricting the flow of EEA travellers. As the participant quoted above describes, in practice, 
freedom of movement is interpreted as guaranteeing movement through border that is not 
only free, but fast. 
As this suggests, the primary challenge posed to Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking work by 
EU freedom of movement lies in the restrictions it poses on the ability of officers to probe 
and question travellers in order to uncover indicators of vulnerability. In contrast to the 
thorough questioning and detailed inquiries they described undertaking in order to assess 
the vulnerability to trafficking of ‘third country’ citizens, processing of European citizens is 
restricted to a ‘cursory’ authentication of identity, at best. Thus EU freedom of movement 
reduces the opportunity to detect initial indicators of vulnerability and to gather further 
evidence of victimhood.  
The irony of a situation in which Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officers are admonished 
to think like first responders but then prevented from acting as such is not lost on the 
Border Force Officers we spoke to:  
We are told that we are not supposed to ask many questions from EU nationals and 
Brit nationals.  Safeguarding actually supersedes that, we are supposed to ask 
questions, and we often are in conflict, immigration and safeguarding. …Now when 
you've got the e-gates coming into play and more use of them, I think they're bringing 
in even more now, and possibly opening them up for minors to use as well, it's going to 
create all sorts of issues relating to Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking. … the only 
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criteria is that you're European, over the age of 18 and hold an electronic passport.  So 
a vulnerable adult could easily slip through. [P1] 
EU freedom of movement at borders has the effect of creating a category of traveler that is 
exempt from anti-slavery monitoring on the basis of their immigration status. Thus we see a 
situation in which immigration status once again overrides vulnerability as the criterion of 
distinction at borders, in direct conflict with the government’s logic of humanitarian 
opportunism that has been so enthusiastically adopted by the Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking team at Heathrow. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the contradictory messages 
coming from the authorities, there was a palpable sense of frustration amongst those we 
spoke to about the opportunities lost. This was compounded by an awareness that the 
majority of those trafficked into the UK are from other European countries.  
I think especially on the European channel, because mostly that's where it's coming 
through, I think that we should be given more powers to stop and interview European 
passengers.  We should be given that, I believe in that.  We would be helping a lot of 
people, yeah. [P6] 
The concern that freedom of movement is tying the hands of Safeguarding and Anti-
Trafficking officers with respect to the largest source of the flow of victims is supported by 
official estimates. According to a United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime report, 61% of 
identified or presumed victims in the EU originated from EU member states (quoted in 
European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014: p.3) A more recent Eurostat report puts 
the estimate of registered victims from within the EU at 65% (Eurostat, 2015: p.11).   
These findings challenge the view that a failure amongst border officers to be alert to and 
recognize those trafficked as victims are the main obstacles to identification and protection 
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at the border. They reveal instead the contradictory nature of the expectations currently 
imposed on Border Officers by the merging of their duties with respect to immigration 
policy and anti-slavery policy. This belies the view, expressed in the policy discourse and 
beyond (McAdam, 2013), that a human rights approach to border control is compatible with 
the strict enforcement of immigration policy, even when such policy is permissive rather 
than exclusionary.  It suggests that, while it is important to recognise individuals as needing 
interventions that both tackle their vulnerability and their status as a potential threat to 
border security this is unlikely to be achievable through the expansion of BFO role to 
accommodate what remain contradictory aims. 
At this point, it is pertinent to address an issue that cannot but have already arisen in 
readers’ minds, namely Britain’s imminent withdrawal from membership of the European 
Union. It is highly likely that European exemption from border control will end before 2020. 
While it is premature to speculate on what this will mean for anti-slavery strategy, let us 
assume that the challenge posed by freedom of movement is a temporary one, and that 
Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officers will soon be able to exercise the full range of their 
powers and skills with respect to this group of travelers. Would the existence of a genuine 
opportunity to identify victims automatically translate into genuine opportunities to help 
them? In the next section, we present findings suggesting that it would not. 
Challenge 2: Getting consent to assistance: between resistance and rationalisation 
In the previous section, we suggested that opportunities to identify those trafficked at 
borders are severely constrained by immigration policy in the form of EU freedom of 
movement. In this section, we argue that, even where identification does occur, the scope 
for genuinely helping those trafficked is far more limited than is often implied. We identify 
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the source of those limits as lying within UK anti-slavery policy itself. We highlight these via 
an examination of the requirement on Border Force Officers to obtain written consent from 
those identified as trafficked to being formally designated as victims as a condition of 
assistance.  
The requirement to obtain consent is a fundamental pillar of the ‘human rights approach’ to 
anti-trafficking victim response, and is presented as a self-evident way of ensuring that the 
agency of victims is respected in the anti-trafficking process (UNOHCHR, 2010). Yet, 
evidence shows that the majority of those identified as victims at the border in fact refuse to 
consent to official referral for assistance through the National Referral Mechanism 
(Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, 2017). Our conversations with Safeguarding and 
Anti-Trafficking officers revealed that the consent requirement was, in their view, the 
second most serious obstacle to effective victim protection at the border: 
Our problem is we encounter these people before exploitation has occurred.  And they 
might even not recognise that they're being coerced or they're scared to tell us, 
because they've been told that… their family members might be threatened and things 
like that.  So they won't tell us… There was a Latvian who come through in her 
twenties.  She was with another female a bit older than her.  And we believed that 
both of them were potential victims of trafficking, but one had been in the game a lot 
longer than the other one.  But both of them […] refused to be taken into the National 
Referral Mechanism because they were both scared.  And we couldn't do anything.  All 
we've done is basic intel, so that if they're encountered again, you know, we know 
what to do, we can recognise that.  We can keep putting it to them, saying that ‘you're 
a PVOT, you're a PVOT’, but they're too scared sometimes to come forward… and if 
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they don't consent, then that's it, they're lost, we can't do anything to help them unless 
they're picked up by police later on.  And even then, they'll probably just abscond from 
there because they're that scared because of that cycle of abuse.  
So I wish there were more powers that we could do, because we identified that 
Latvian, I wish that we could have just said, ‘no, we can take you away from here’.  But 
things like that are not immediately resolved. It takes…it's a long process. [P1] 
And another, more experienced officer told us: 
Well, no one's going to admit they're vulnerable.  Nobody's going to admit that, oh, 
somebody's doing… If that person's frightened of the individual who brought them 
here, they're not going to say nothing.  And no matter what you say, it isn't going to 
happen. [P9] 
And most of them will say no, I'm not being trafficked.  Because it's before exploitation 
has occurred.  So they think they're coming here to have a better life. … And they might 
even not recognise that they're being coerced. [P2] 
We revisit the views and sentiments expressed in these quotes in more detail below. First 
we turn to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to explain the reasons 
for making assistance dependent on formal consent: 
A human rights approach requires that the provision of care and support should be 
both informed and non-coercive. For example, victims of trafficking should receive 
information on their entitlements so they can make an informed decision about what 
to do. As discussed above, care and support should not be made conditional on 
cooperation with criminal justice authorities. Victims should also be able to refuse 
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care and support. They should not be forced into accepting or receiving assistance. 
(UN OHCHR, 2010: 14) 
The emphasis on unforced and voluntary acceptance of assistance is understandable: it 
seems obvious that the last thing anti-slavery first responders should be doing is employing 
the same techniques used by traffickers to violate the rights of their victims; to do so would 
merely compound the violation of the victim’s autonomy. 
However, closer examination of the consent requirement reveals that it is being applied in 
ways that diverge from this model. For, in the UK, the provision of assistance is conditional 
on consent to things other than assistance, things that those identified as victims may have 
good reason to refuse. For example, the National Referral Mechanism form those identified 
as victims are asked to sign involves a clearly stated requirement to self-identify as a ‘victim 
of crime’ and to share one’s details with the police, UK Visas and Immigration, the Home 
Office and other agencies (National Referral Mechanism referral form, 2016). But research 
in other countries has shown that many are reluctant to self-identify as victims for a variety 
of possible reasons, all of which inhibit their willingness to consent. 10 
Like other victims of or witnesses to organized crime, victims of trafficking can be subject to 
threats and negative conditioning by traffickers which, together with a fear of the 
‘authorities’ can lead to reluctance to declare themselves a victim of crime and to engage 
with the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2014). Some are in love with their traffickers 
and do not want to expose them to criminal penalties (Bovenkerk et al (2006). In some 
                                                          
10 It is not possible to make reliable claims about which of the consent-inhibiting conditions identified by 
researchers elsewhere apply to travellers arriving in the UK, because there is no systematic research on the 
factors influencing the decisions of those identified as victims at the border to give or withhold consent. 
Research of this kind, giving voice to victim experiences, is clearly sorely needed. 
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cases, victims of trafficking face huge debts already that they need to work to pay off, and 
do not want the financial burden to fall on their families (Warren, 2012: 112). In others, they 
may be waiting to receive unpaid wages, which would be placed at risk by their acceptance 
of assistance (Rende Taylor and Latonero, 2018: 11).  And research in Eastern Europe 
revealed that many victims of trafficking are not willing to take on a label that they see as 
stigmatizing, and which might lead to social rejection in their home community (Brunovskis 
and Surtees, 2012). 
But fear of reprisals, penalties, or stigmatisation are not the only reasons why those 
identified as vulnerable may be reluctant to self-identify as victims of trafficking. 
Ethnographic work in the USA has shown that migrants who would qualify as ‘potential 
victims of trafficking’ may simply not see themselves as victims at all, sometimes because 
they have chosen to take on dangerous and exploitative work as an improvement on what 
other life was on offer (Dejanova and Raghavan, 2013; Davies: 2009). Some see the 
exploitative or even abusive conditions they are subjected to as an unfortunate job choice 
and view themselves not as victims but as active agents (Warren, 2012: 11-13). In sum, the 
current reliance on a simplistic binary categorization of debased victim/fully autonomous 
agent fails to recognise the many ways in which those trafficked exercise agency and choice 
even in situations of dire coercion and exploitation (Kempadoo, 2017; O’Connell Davidson, 
2015; Tietjens-Mejers; 2014). Making the offer of help dependent on self-identification as a 
‘victim’ therefore sits uncomfortably with the aim of restoring dignity and autonomy and 
helping people take control over their lives.11 
                                                          
11 Similar tensions have been identified in the policing of domestic violence in the UK, especially around the 
requirement imposed on police to complete intelligence forms that involve probing victims for sensitive details 
and sharing information with other agencies, including social services. This has strained the relationship of 
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What is more, there are reasons to question the extent to which either the refusal or the 
giving of consent to referral through the National Referral Mechanism meets the conditions 
for validity that normally apply to other policy contexts in which consent is sought- namely 
capacity to consent and sufficient information about the consequences of consenting or not 
consenting. Psychological and cognitive factors resulting from traumatization, such as post-
traumatic stress disorder (Ottisova et al, 2017; Helen Bamber Foundation, 2017: 6-7) as well 
as the inevitable language difficulties can affect the capacity of those trafficked to consent 
to assistance (Bruovskis and Surtees, 2012). Addressing these issues well enough to secure 
meaningful consent requires frontline professionals to receive trauma training, and to have 
sufficient time to build a relationship of trust with those identified as victims (Helen Bamber 
Foundation, 2017: 2-4); Border Force Officers have neither. To make things worse, Border 
Force Officers are themselves too poorly informed about what happens to victims as a result 
of their decision to consent or to refuse to be able in turn to render the consent informed 
enough to be meaningful (Lynch and Hadjimatheou, 2017). Yet, even if they were better 
informed, the question of how they should represent the possible outcomes to those 
identified is not straightforward. The potential benefits to victims of referral through the 
National Referral Mechanism are by no means obvious. For example, two highly critical 
recent reports have revealed that many of those who receive government support as 
victims do so for only 45 days, after which they are either returned home or left destitute 
(Human Trafficking Foundation, 2016; UK Parliament Work and Pensions Committee, 2017). 
Of those left destitute, a significant number end up returning to their exploiters and being 
re-trafficked (Ibid, 2017).  
                                                          
trust between victims and police and has potentially discouraged some victims from being more open with 
police, in ways that may affect their safety and wellbeing in the longer term (Loftus, 2009:135-5) 
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How then, is the requirement to gain consent negotiated by Border Force Officers, in the 
light of such challenges? We found evidence of both attempts to resist the refusal by 
deploying paternalistic strategies, and to rationalize it as a fully informed and autonomous 
exercise of choice on the part of the person trafficked: 
If that adult decides that they don't want to be part of the National Referral 
Mechanism and you know that where they're going, it may not be the most safe place, 
you have to accept that not everyone wants your help. [P7]  
This strategy of rationalization contrasts with that of resistance, described to us by other 
Border Force Officers. A number of respondents complained that the need to obtain 
consent from victims of trafficking represented an unwelcome departure from previous 
practice in the Children and Young Persons team. The Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking 
officers we spoke to expressed a desire to pressure victims into accepting assistance, 
reflecting the kind of ‘caring paternalism’ McCarthy has described, involving ‘well-
intentioned attempts to formulate some sense of action being taken to help individuals’ 
(McCarthy, 2014: 82). One senior Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking officer reported making 
efforts at a strategic level to challenge it but being blocked by ‘lots of legal stuff around 
consent for adults and human rights’ [P8].12 However, as the quotes at the beginning of this 
section illustrate, they also deploy coercive powers, such as subjecting victims to forced 
returns to their country of origin in the name of their own protection, despite the fact that 
                                                          
12 Though we did not find evidence to corroborate this, in 2013 the UK’s Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group 
reported that they had seen evidence of first responder attempts to bypass consent by giving potential victims 
a blank National Referral Mechanism form to sign. 
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there is little evidence suggesting that forced returns are indeed a protective measure 
(Lynch and Hadjimatheou, 2017).  
This lurching between resistance and rationalization reflects the contradictory demands on 
Border Officers of a policy that requires them to act as humanitarian first responders but 
equips them to do so only with the powers and tools of law enforcement. The reality is that 
currently Border Officers are not encouraged to reflect on how their actions ultimately 
contribute to the protection of people’s rights. Border Officers typically receive no feedback 
about what happens to those who they attempt to identify as trafficked (Lynch and 
Hadjimatheou, 2017).13 Instead, the highly charged rhetoric of humanitarian opportunism 
deflects attention away from the question of long-term assistance to the more manageable 
issue of identification and recognition. The recent report by the Chief Inspector of Borders is 
a prime example of this.  
 
As the discussion in this section illustrates, the issue of consent raises profound questions 
about what the Modern Slavery Strategy does for those identified as victims and how it does 
it. The government’s approach to anti-trafficking first response insists first and foremost on 
the importance of taking advantage of humanitarian opportunities to identify and recognise 
those trafficked ‘as victims’. Yet while this rightly emphasizes the missed opportunities and 
potential harms of a failure to recognize victims as such, it begs the question of what good 
                                                          
13 The new statutory ‘duty to notify’, which came into force after the research for this paper was conducted, 
introduces a potential source of feedback and monitoring for Border Force, by mandating the recording and 
reporting to central government each case in which an Officer identifies someone as a potential victim of 
trafficking but does not, for whatever reason, refer them through the National Referral Mechanism. 
Notifications are anonoymous unless those identified as potential victims agree to be identified. For further 
details see the UK government’s Duty to Notify webpage at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/duty-to-notify-the-home-office-of-potential-victims-of-
modern-slavery   
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recognition does for victims. What does and what should it mean to treat someone as a 
‘victim of trafficking’? These questions are not easily answered, partly because the 
experiences of coercion and exploitation and the individual needs of those trafficked can be 
so diverse in practice- a fact that reflects how wide an umbrella the term ‘trafficking’ or 
‘slavery’ has become. Clearly, much more work needs to be done, both by researchers and 
by those in the human rights anti-trafficking movement, to explore both the form that the 
consent requirement takes in practice and the role it should play in approaches to anti-
slavery. Such work should consider not only how respect for autonomy might be achieved in 
such challenging circumstances, but also how much weight it should be given in the light of 
competing considerations. This means re-examining the proper role of paternalism, ‘caring’ 
or otherwise, in anti-slavery policy and practice, including by giving voice to those trafficked 
about their experiences with the consent requirement. It also means reconsidering the 
current practice of requiring those identified as trafficked to adopt the questionable label of 
‘victim’ as a condition of protection and support.  
More generally, the discussion in this section serves to highlight just how difficult it is to do 
effective humanitarian anti-slavery work at the border, which despite the political rhetoric 
and the efforts of individual anti-trafficking teams remains above all a site of migration and 
security control.   
 
Conclusion 
Much has been written about the contradictions between humanitarian anti-slavery policy 
and hardline approaches to immigration control and security (Perkowski, 2016; O’Connell 
Davidson, 2015, 2017; Sharma, 2017). By articulating and unpicking the rationale of 
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humanitarian opportunism, this paper has provided some insight into one of the most 
recent ways in which security and humanitarian policy aims are represented as consistent, 
even complementary, by government. By exploring the experiences of those on the 
frontline attempting to implement both victim protection and immigration control, it has 
shed light on some unacknowledged sources of enduring conflict between these policies. 
The casualties of these conflicts are, of course, those trafficked. But, in contrast to what is 
implied by the recent criticism of the UK Border Force, the source of the persistent failures 
in their protection lies in these contradictory policies, rather than merely a failure of first 
response.  
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